Highly publicized predictions of 50-100 municipal defaults have caused anxiety among municipal bond investors. While there is some chance that negative investor sentiment will lead to further spread widening, the probability of the kind of widespread default that would be required to justify current municipal bond yields is low. In this paper we document the reasons why the fears of widespread municipal default during the current recession are overblown.
 In sum, fears of widespread municipal default are overblown. Although spreads have tightened somewhat since December, doomsday scenarios have already been incorporated into market prices. While there is a good chance that negative investor sentiment will lead to further spread widening, the probability of the kind of widespread default that would be required to justify current municipal bond yields is low.
Background: why do states and localities borrow in the United States?
Under the 10 th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the fifty individual states retain power over facets of government that are not explicitly constrained or turned over to the Federal government. This means that in the United States areas like elementary, secondary, and higher education, law enforcement and corrections, and public assistance are generally left to state and local control. Each state has its own constitution, and these individual constitutions often very detailed and specific (unlike the United States Constitution) about state and local spending, borrowing, and taxing. Within the states, the authority of cities and counties is established by state legislatures. Their abilities to tax, spend, and borrow vary from state to state.
Municipal authorities borrow for two primary reasons. First, they borrow to fund infrastructure projects.
Borrowing to fund an infrastructure project such as a school, road, or hospital aligns the timing of payment and benefits: if a road will have a useful life of 30 years, borrowing to pay for the road over 30 years means that the same generation will both pay for and use the road. Borrowing is also used when infrastructure projects are immediately necessary in order to comply with federal or other guidelines.
For example, a municipal wastewater treatment facility may require immediate upgrades to comply with federal standards. Municipal borrowing to fund a project like this would be the only way to avoid sudden cuts in other services or increases in taxes.
States and localities also occasionally borrow on a short-term basis because the seasonal timing of municipal receipts does not match the timing of expenditures. In these situations, states and localities issue short-term instruments (often called Revenue Anticipation Notes or Grant Anticipation Notes) to cover the time period between expenditures and receipts.
There are some important differences between states budget processes and the budget processes that prevail among sovereigns. 4 Forty-four of the fifty states have constitutional or statutory requirements mandating that the governor submit a balanced budget to the legislature. Thirty-seven states have a requirement that the final budget be balanced. In principle, only seven states 5 allow a deficit to be carried from one year to the next. As the next section discusses, these restrictions are not always as binding as they appear at first blush. But they do appear to have an impact on state responses to economic downturns. A GAO survey (GAO, 1993) estimated that during the 1988-1992 recession forty-nine percent of the deficit reduction came through spending cuts, and another thirty-two percent was achieved through revenue increases. The remainder was closed with borrowing, drawing down 'rainy-day' funds, and other (often dubious) accounting adjustments. 6 To the extent that they are followed, these limitations on borrowing and carrying forward deficits expose states to cyclical volatility. State revenues tend to be pro-cyclical, rising with economic activity and falling in recessions. Expenditures, in particular for public assistance, are often highest in economic troughs. With borrowing to cover operating deficits generally limited by constitution or statute, states are often forced to cut services or raise taxes at the bottom of the economic cycle. 
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. 8 One particular indicator of the depth of the current recession is the extent of state budget cuts that have been made after annual state budgets have been passed. These post-budget spending cuts reflect downside 'surprises' in revenues, surprises that need to be accommodated using within-year spending cuts. Figure 1 shows the pattern of within-period budget cuts back to 1990. 9 The post-budget cuts during 4 See NASBO, 2008. 5 California, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 6 Of this remaining 19 percent, 32 (or 6 percent of the total) percent came from drawing down rainy-day funds, 22 percent came from inter-fund transfers, 17 percent came from short-term borrowing, and 13 percent came from deferring payments. Rainy-day funds are state reserves of liquid assets used to cover expenditures during fiscal emergencies. Aggregate rainy day fund balances at the end of 2010 were estimated by the National Association of State Budget Officers to total $27.6 billion. 7 For example, the state legislature in Illinois recently voted to raise personal income taxes by 66 percent in order to balance the 2011 budget, and the governor of California has proposed to reduce higher education funding by $1 billion. NASBO, 2010 describes state-by-state approaches to balancing budgets during the recent economic recession. 8 Under government accounting practices, the General Fund accounts for all financial resources except for those that are specifically required, either by law or by accounting standards, to be accounted for in a different fund. Many states and localities have statutory or constitutional requirements to establish separate funds used exclusively for particular projects. For example, Article IX of the Michigan Constitution creates the State School Aid Fund, which is used exclusively for lower and higher education and for the school employee retirement systems. 9 Reproduced from NASBO, 2010.
the current recession have exceeded the cuts of the past two recessions, indicating the severity of the current recession relative to the milder earlier recessions.
Continuing with this theme, Figure 2 shows aggregate state and local receipts between 1960 and 2010.
The figure is based on data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the benchmark Table 1 shows the same data but only for the more recent period.
The figure shows the aggregate mix of funding sources for the state and local sector. Local governments are generally financed with property taxes and with transfers from the states, while state governments are financed with personal and corporate income taxes. Aggregate receipts from property taxes have so far been relatively stable during the recession, but this pattern masks significant local and regional differences. This stability has come because changes in property valuations often occur with significant lags, and it is reasonable to expect that property tax collections will lag even as the economy recovers.
Aggregate personal income taxes, which play a larger role in state finances, have already been hard-hit during the recession. Personal income taxes adjust to the business cycle with minimal lags, and state tax receipts are likely to recover more quickly than local receipts as the economy recovers. Transfers from the Federal government have played an important role in offsetting declines in personal income and sales taxes. Net borrowing, perhaps reflecting the use of borrowing to evade balanced budget requirements, has also played a role, although net borrowing has been smaller than during the early part of the decade.
During the current recession, net borrowing has already fallen significantly from its peak in the third quarter of 2008.
The rapid declines in state and local tax receipts during the current recession and the resulting spending cuts have helped to create an atmosphere of fiscal crisis. This atmosphere of crisis may in turn have affected sentiment in municipal credit markets. But although municipal balanced budget requirements are not perfect (see in particular the section on pensions below), from the perspective of municipal credit quality the rapid spending cuts during the recession by and large reflect strength and not vulnerability.
Because in general the states rely on credit markets to finance infrastructure projects, rather than relying on markets to roll over operating deficits, the consequences of an investor 'strike' in the municipal bond market would be benign relative to a circumstance where the borrower relied on creditors to continue covering operating deficits. It is true that if bond buyers stopped purchasing new bonds today, new infrastructure projects would become difficult or impossible to finance. The average age of roads, school, hospitals, and jails would rise, and their quality would deteriorate. But the bonds that had financed those projects are very likely to be repaid.
Do state balanced budget restrictions really matter?
The previous section noted the near-universal existence of state balanced budget requirements. The true nature of these balanced budget requirements can often be more flexible than they appear at first. A variety of legal and accounting maneuvers are often available for states to avoid cuts to services in the face of significant budget problems. A recent paper by Hou and Smith (2006) documents the flexibility behind state balanced budget requirements. In addition to demonstrating the cross-state differences in the stringency of these requirements, they show how well-informed observers can even come to different conclusions about the stringency of the balanced budget requirements for a particular state.
10 Surprisingly, many states allow a budget to be considered 'balanced' if they can borrow to cover the deficit. In the last year both Connecticut and New Hampshire have borrowed in order to 'balance budgets.' New Hampshire issued $51 million worth of Debt Service bonds to pay for current debt payments. Cathy Provencher, New Hampshire Treasury Secretary, noted that this method of balancing the budget was unprecedented for the state of New Hampshire, and the practice appears to remain unusual.
There is also significant heterogeneity across states in the extent to which balanced budget requirements are legally enforced. At one extreme, the Oklahoma Constitution mandates that appropriations from a fund be reduced pro-rata if revenues fall below forecast. This turns out to be a rather binding implementation. Alternatively, Virginia has a constitutional requirement that the governor maintain spending below revenues, but does not appear to have any legal mechanism for enforcing this requirement. The Michigan Constitution allows 'unavoidable' deficits to be carried over to the next fiscal year, and does not define 'unavoidable.'
10 See also Poterba (1995) for a review of the literature on the impact of balanced budget rules. Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) point to the introduction of Tax and Expenditure Limitations, which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, as a driving force between the adoption of fiscally evasive tools. They note that state and local governments responded to the TELs by placing billions of dollars of expenditure off-budget, into what they describe as 'Off-Budget Enterprises' or OBEs. These OBES are generally financed by revenue bonds, which are often not subject to the same restrictions as general obligation debt.
Poterba (1995) points out that exact nature of a balanced budget requirement can depend on the stage of the budget process at which balanced is required. In New Hampshire, the governor is required by statute to submit a balanced budget, but there is no requirement that the legislature pass or that the governor sign a budget that is balanced. Focusing on the specific tools for 'balancing budgets,' other approaches include the delay of tax refunds, delaying payments to vendors, and deferring funding of pension plans. The current recession has also seen some high-profile asset sales by states. As Barrett and Greene (2010) note, Arizona recently sold off $737 million worth of state assets, which generated money to close a current budget gap. The state will now have to lease back space in offices it once owned. In that sense, the state's sale-leaseback represents the economic equivalent of a debt issue. Barrett and Greene note similar long-term costs to delaying payments to vendors: over time, vendors build in higher margins to compensate for these payment delays.
Issuing short-term debt is another gimmick identified by the GAO as a tool for balancing budgets during fiscal crises. Thus one sign of fiscal trouble for state and local borrowers is increasing reliance on the issuance of short-term debt. Figure 1 suggests that net debt issuance during the recent recession had already peaked, and was in any case smaller than the net debt issuance during and following the 2001 recession. These aggregate figures mask cross-state variation, however, and Table 3 appears consistent with significant budget stress, but does not appear large enough to cause widespread liquidity problems like those that are now occurring in parts of Europe.
To be more specific on the comparison to sovereign borrowers, State and local budgets are under stress, and some states are relying on short-term debt issuance and other types of fiscal gimmicks. But it is fair to say that the picture is worse for the sovereign borrowers highlighted in the IMF report.
The largest channel for municipal fiscal evasion is pensions, an issue that receives specific coverage in a section below. On the whole, the flexibility of the balanced budget rules makes it more accurate to say that states have very strong and long-standing traditions of running balanced budgets, and that these traditions are generally backed up by some form of legal protection. Over time there is a risk that fiscal evasion and gimmicks will become increasingly accepted; the unprecedented actions of the current recession may be viewed as time-honored traditions during the next one. In addition, states and localities that balance budgets by selling off assets will eventually find that all of their monetizable assets have been liquidated. Cities that use asset sales and other budget gimmicks to postpone fiscal adjustments will eventually face very abrupt tax increases or service cuts. This is the situation now in Harrisburg, PA, which is covered in a case study in the final section below.
But balanced budget requirements, though not perfect, do appear to have an effect. Most of the adjustments in cyclical downturns come through tax increases and service cuts, and the states with more stringent balanced budget requirements adjust using deeper expenditure cuts. It is very likely that a combination of economic recovery and other factors will allow states and localities to weather the current recession. The current recession will not be the last, however, and the states and localities that continue to rely on evasive budget practices will be more vulnerable during the next cyclical downturn.
How indebted are states and municipalities today?
The section above describes a variety of budget gimmicks that can be used to balance budget, but by far the biggest hole in state and local balanced budget requirements comes from their sponsorship of defined benefit pension plans. In fact, the measurement of net state and local borrowing depends crucially on the accurately measuring pension liabilities.
Defined benefit pension programs can be viewed as functionally equivalent to debt. For example, if a state employee accepts a generous pension plan in exchange for low wages today, then the state has effectively borrowed from the employee rather than borrowing from capital markets. The rapid increase in the amount by which state and local pensions are underfunded reflects the use of pension programs to relax municipal budget constraints.
The accounting rules applied to states and cities do not accurately reflect the true value of their pension liabilities. This pension accounting problem goes hand-in-hand with the generosity of many municipal pension arrangements. The programs are particularly generous and their costs have not been reflected accurately.
Pension promises are long-duration promises. Their current value is sensitive to the discount rate assumption used to value them. Municipalities, with the blessing of the Government Accounting
Standard Board, continue to use inappropriately high discount rates for valuing these long-term pension liabilities. The inappropriately high discount rates deliver inappropriately low measures of true municipal pension liabilities.
A recent paper by Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh shows the impact of this discount rate assumption on pension liability valuation. Table 5 , reproduced from their paper, shows state-by-state levels of state municipal debt and of a more comprehensive net debt measure that includes the net pension liability, measured using the Treasury rate as the discount rate for these liabilities. The use of the Treasury rate to discount these liabilities increases their magnitude and has a significant impact on measured state Table 4 does not include city and county bonds, 'Nearly all state and local pension defined benefit plans compute the present value of their future liabilities using the expected return on the assets held in the pension trust. This practice contrasts sharply with finance theory, which is unambiguous that the appropriate discount rate is one that reflects the riskiness of the liabilities, not the assets.'
surely an underestimate of their true value. But the figure does not include the substantial assets that partially offset those pension liabilities.
Both explicit debt and interest payments as a share of GDP peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s. Interest payments have fallen from 1 percent of GDP to under .80 percent of GDP since the 1980s. While debt amounts have risen over the past 10 years, they are still below the peak reached in the early 1990s.
Including the gross value of pension liabilities suggests that total debt relative to GDP (not including the value of pension assets) has varied between 30 percent and 40 percent since the early 1990s.
But neither the explicit debt nor the pension debt seem likely to cause widespread liquidity crises during the current recession. Both forms of debt are very long-term debt. Figure 4 shows the maturity profile of explicit municipal debt as of early 2011. The maturity profile is very smooth over the next 30 years, with no more than 5 percent of outstanding debt maturing in any year on the horizon. Table 6 shows the maturity structure of debt, by state, highlighting the cross-state differences in the amount of debt maturing over the next five years.
Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby (2010) use simulation evidence to show that the fiscal adjustments needed to address the public pension problem are feasible. Their simulations show that even at the most conservative (lowest discount rate) valuation assumptions for pension liabilities, increasing contributions in order to fully fund pension liabilities would mean that pension contributions as a share of state and local budgets would rise from around 4 percent today to 9.1 percent by 2014. This increase will require some combination of tax increases and spending cuts, but is feasible.
The picture for state and local indebtedness suggests three things. First, explicit municipal debt and debt burdens are not currently at historical peaks. A recent Moody's study of municipal defaults studied the 1970-2009 period, and found very small default losses over this period (see below). Over that period, municipal interest payments as a share of GDP have generally been higher than they are today. In that sense the Moody's study may lead to an inappropriately pessimistic forecast of future municipal bond performance.
This optimism must be tempered by a consideration of true extent of municipal indebtedness -which should include net borrowing through underfunded pension plans. Budget and accounting rules have worked together to cause a pension funding problem, and true net debt, including pensions, is much higher than explicit municipal borrowing.
Finally, both municipal debt and pension promises reflect long-term promises. While there will be highprofile individual problems, there is a small chance of across-the-board immediate liquidity problems on either the pension front or the bonds front. The adjustments needed to bring the pension problem into line, though painful, are manageable with timely adjustment. 12 And capital markets are now aware of the pension issue. The municipal pension problem is not going to sneak up on anybody.
Retiree health insurance, though potentially a drag on budgets, poses less of a problem than pensions for a variety of reasons. Most importantly, pension promises are often backed by explicit state constitutional guarantees. 13 In other cases, these pension promises are otherwise protected by law. In general, retiree health benefits do not enjoy these protections. These retiree health benefits can be modified or terminated much more easily than pensions can be cut.
What is the historic loss experience on municipal debt?
Losses due to default on municipal debt have been rare. In describing the loss experience on American municipal debt, it is important to make a distinction between two types of municipal debt. So-called 'General Obligation' debt 14 is secured by a pledge from a state or local government to use tax revenues in order to pay interest and principal on the bond. A so-called 'revenue bond' is secured only by the revenues from a particular project. For example, the construction of a toll road could be financed either using General Obligation bonds or using revenue bonds. If the road were financed using revenue bonds, then the bonds would be secured only by toll revenue.
A recent Moody's study looked at the experience of the municipal bonds that they had rated between 1970 and 2009. The average 5-year cumulative default rate for all municipal debt was 0.05 percent. The
Moody's study also suggested that losses given default have been low. Ultimate recovery rates on the defaults in their sample averaged 67 percent. Taken together, this suggests a 5-year cumulative loss rate of less than 0.02 percent.
Seventy-eight percent of the defaults in the Moody's sample occurred on revenue bonds in the healthcare and housing finance sectors. For general obligation bonds, the 5-year cumulative default rate was 0.00 percent. The 5-year cumulative default rate for all non-general obligation debt was 0.11 percent.
12 As the day of reckoning with unfunded pension liabilities is pushed off, the pain of the adjustment to fully funding pension promises will become increasingly sharp. 13 For example, Article XII, Section 5 of the Illinois State Constitution: 'membership in any pension or retirement system of the State…shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.' 14 About 45 percent of municipal bonds are general obligation bonds.
State and local borrowing (scaled by GDP) during the period covered in the Moody's study have fluctuated within a range, and are not currently at historical peaks (see Figure 3) . Reflecting the use of defined benefit pension plans to evade balanced budget requirements, state debt plus gross pension liabilities have had something of an upward trend, although they are not now at levels that are meaningfully different from the levels observed during the 1990s. Thus the Moody's study, which found minimal losses due to default, covered a time period that looks similar to what we observe today.
The last state default, and the only state default in the post-Reconstruction period, was Arkansas' default. 
What about investor flows?
Recent credit spreads on municipal bonds suggest that the market expects very high rates of default over the medium term. 16 Such a scenario is extremely unlikely for the reasons described in the earlier sections. Thus current spreads, although they have tightened noticeably since the beginning of the year, reflect bearish investor sentiment. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the 5-year MCDX municipal credit spread over the past year. Market prices are already factoring in a disaster scenario. If there is an aggregate 'surprise' in municipal credit markets, it will be on the upside, as the market-forecasted default rates fail to materialize.
But investor sentiment can push prices out of equilibrium for long periods of time. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon. One example comes from refunded municipal bonds: these are bonds that are secured by United States Treasury securities held in escrow. The credit risk of these refunded bonds is equivalent to the credit risk of Treasuries, and they pay tax-exempt interest. With 70 percent recovery, this spread is consistent with a risk-neutral expectation of 3.63 defaults per year out of the index's fifty names, or a seven percent default rate. Because defaults frequency is likely correlated with economic downturns, it is reasonable to expect that the risk-neutral probability of municipal default exceeds the physical measure probability of default.
spread actually inverted, with the refunded municipal bonds paying a higher pre-tax yield than treasury bonds. 17 While that obvious anomaly has been reversed, it highlights the potential for prices to remain out of equilibrium for extended periods of time.
Municipal bonds are largely a retail investment, either held through mutual funds or directly by investors.
Investor flows into municipal mutual funds are an important indicator of investor sentiment, and the recent signals continue to be bad. These flows can continue to exert a negative influence on municipal bond prices, and there is no guarantee that spreads will not widen again in the future.
Wagner and Sobel (2006) note that there is some precedent for the loss of an entire class of municipal investors. The changes in the tax code with the 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the tax advantages that depository institutions had enjoyed in holding municipal debt. Prior to the reform, these institutions had been able to deduct interest payments on debt used to finance tax-exempt debt, a rule that allowed the institutions to enjoy a spread between the net return on their municipal investments and the after-tax cost of their financing. The 1986 tax reform eliminated this practice. At the same time, by reducing the marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution, the reform reduced the advantage to holding municipal debt. Banks can deduct 80 percent of the carrying cost of these obligations from their taxes. Issuers must be 'qualified small issuers,' now defined as issuers who sell no more than $30 million of tax-exempt bonds during the year. In the event of a continuing investor strike, one potential channel of indirect federal support for the municipal bond market could be to further relax the rules governing bank-qualified debt.
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The decline of the financial guarantors will play an important role in changing the nature of household investment in municipal bonds. Stable financial guarantors commoditized roughly half of the market, and allowed relatively uninformed investors to invest based on the credit ratings of the monoline insurers.
With stable guarantors now a thing of the past, the role for active credit management of municipal bond portfolios has increased. 20 This suggests that the locus of household investing in municipal securities will move from the direct channel to intermediated channels. There will be some bumps in this process, and the protracted investor strike in the municipal market may reflect the opening stage of a reallocation of household investment in municipal securities from direct investments in bonds to indirect investments in professionally managed investment vehicles.
Finally, although some states and localities have been relying on credit markets to finance operating deficits during the recent crisis, municipalities, in general, rely on credit markets to finance new investment in infrastructure. This swing in investor sentiment is not likely to cause across-the-board problems for municipalities rolling over debt of the sort that highly-leveraged financial institutions and nations have experienced. There will be some municipal defaults, however, and particularly high-profile municipal defaults could have a prolonged impact on market sentiment. A prolonged municipal bond investor strike would lead to aging and deteriorating infrastructure. But regardless of investor sentiment, across-the-board municipal bond default is not likely.
What about reduced Recovery Act Federal support for states and localities?
The 19 This mechanism of federal support would be less directly obvious than the direct payments from the federal government that came with the Build America Bonds program. While political economy can be complicated, it is reasonable to expect that less-obvious subsidies will be favored over more-obvious ones. The 2009 Recovery Act increased the 'qualified small issuer' threshold from $10 million of issuance to $30 million. 20 Or more accurately, the active credit management activity is moving from the insurers to mutual funds and other investment vehicles.
Many analysts have pointed out that, along with budget cuts, tax increases, and reserve funds, the Recovery Act funding has helped states and cities so far during the deep recession. One potential implication is that as Recovery Act funding dries up, states and localities will face severe fiscal headwinds.
The largest component of Recovery Act support has come through the Federal Medical Assistance Program (FMAP), which provides matching federal funding for state support for Medicaid spending. A recent GAO report (GAO, 2010) suggests that this program has helped states maintain Medicaid eligibility and benefit levels during the current recession, and suggests that the reduction in Federal support through the Recovery Act may make it difficult for states to sustain these levels of services.
A second component of Recovery Act support funded states' efforts to restore highways and other roads.
In that sense, the Recovery Act financed infrastructure projects that would otherwise have been deferred.
The Recovery Act also established a State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, targeted at fixing shortfalls in state support for elementary, secondary, and higher education. Most analysts believe that the withdrawal of
Recovery Act support will increase fiscal stress with respect to public education and increase the depth of cuts needed to balance budgets.
What about the declining credit quality of financial guarantors?
The period between 1980 and 2007 saw rapid growth in the share of municipal bonds that are insured by third-party financial guarantors. These insurers, often referred to as 'monoline' insurers due to their one business of insuring bonds, insured about half of all new issues by 2007.
The monoline insurers also expanded into insuring structured products based on residential mortgages.
The collapse of that market that started in 2006 left almost all of the financial guarantors in precarious financial positions. Because these guarantors had previously carried the highest credit ratings, the bonds that they had insured had carried the highest credit ratings as well. The collapse of the insurers means now that the credit quality of these municipal bonds is now more directly affected by the credit quality of the underlying municipal issuers.
The struggles of the bond insurers have been an unfortunate surprise for holders of insured municipal debt. But these struggles have no impact on the underlying credit quality of municipal issuers, as described above. The tiny default losses on municipal debt always made the existence of bond insurance something of a puzzle: when it came to insuring municipal bonds the entire industry was, to a first approximation, insuring against events that never happened. The most important effect of the decline of the monoline insurers is that credit research will now be performed by the investor (or investment manager) rather than the monoline insurer.
What about proposals that would allow states to file for bankruptcy protection?
In states that allow municipal bankruptcy filings, Chapter 9 of the United States bankruptcy code is available to localities seeking protection from their creditors. Before the introduction of municipal bankruptcy laws in 1934, the main remedy for creditors of a municipality in default was to petition state courts to compel the municipality to increase taxes. The introduction of the chapter in federal bankruptcy code specifically focusing on municipalities was a response to perceived weaknesses in the pre-1934 regime and was designed to alleviate the burden of destructive creditor competition in situations of municipal distress. A number of differences distinguish municipal bankruptcy from the more familiar corporate and personal bankruptcy processes. For example, the municipality enjoys the exclusive right to propose restructuring proposals, and there is no arrangement available (nor would one make sense) for the liquidation of a municipality.
Municipal bankruptcy filings that involve general obligation debt come in two types. Although municipalities have long-term budget problems, there does not seem to be a broad push coming from states and cities to expand the bankruptcy option for municipalities. This likely reflects two factors.
First, for most states and localities payments on municipal debt are low enough that the chaos and loss of control that would follow a municipal bankruptcy filing are not worth the limited benefits that would follow.
A second factor reflects the political economy of municipal bonds: they are disproportionately held by within-state high-net-worth individual investors. The pain of municipal default or bankruptcy would not be felt by far-away institutions. That pain would be felt by people who are close, who are rich, and who tend to vote. This drives our forecast that most of the pain from any coming fiscal adjustments will be borne those who rely on state and local services, and not by holders of municipal debt. Sacramento. The plan is unique in that it proposes paying general unsecured creditors much less than the full value of their claims. This would be the first time that a city or county under bankruptcy protection had paid creditors less than the nominal value that they were owed. It remains unclear whether the court will approve the proposal, but an approval involving partial payments would be a new and potentially unsettling precedent for municipal credit markets.
Municipal crisis case studies
Vallejo's problems stem in part from unusually generous compensation arrangements for city police and protection was used to prevent the seizure of assets while the county arranged a plan to pay its creditors, which it eventually did in full through tax increases and spending cuts. The most likely forecast is that Boise County will do the same -use the bankruptcy protection to arrange a plan for repaying its new creditor. The county does not have any bonds outstanding.
c. Jefferson County, AL
While the overall liquidity of municipalities is strong, Jefferson, Alabama is an example of a municipality that has been driven to default by unusually poor liquidity management. Jefferson moved in 2002 away from fixed-rate debt toward using a combination of variable-rate debt and interest rate swaps. This transition, at least in retrospect, appears to have been a mistake. This variable-rate debt included AuctionRate Securities as well as other types of variable-rate debt.
Auction-Rate securities are long-term securities that pay a floating coupon based on periodic auctions.
These auctions are often held at a monthly or weekly frequency. In the event of a 'failed auction,' current holders of the securities continue to hold the securities and the coupon rate resets to a pre-specified 'maximum' rate, often some multiple of LIBOR or some other benchmark rate. 25 On a bond-weighted basis, all kinds of variable-rate financing amounts to about 4.4 percent of municipal debt currently outstanding. This total includes all kinds of variable-rate financing, ranging from very simple floating-rate notes to more highly structured instruments like ARS and VRDOs. Weighted by dollar face value outstanding, the total amounts to 17.3 percent of outstanding municipal debt; variablerate bonds tend to be much larger than other types of municipal debt. 26 Table 6 shows for each state the amount of debt issued by all of the issuers in that state, as well as the share of that debt that is maturing soon and the share of the debt that is variable rate. This table illustrates the heterogeneity in potential liquidity problems across states. Wisconsin, although not unusually highly levered, has a significant share of its debt maturing in the next year. Mississippi has a large share of variable-rate debt. If this debt is matched with appropriate hedges, the state would be vulnerable to budget problems if there were a spike in municipal yields
It is possible that other municipalities will turn out to have mismanaged liquidity risk related to variablerate financing and interest rate swaps. But the extent of mismanagement and crime in Jefferson County appears to be unique. The collapse of the ARS market is now three years in the past, and while other municipalities were adversely affected, Jefferson County remains the only major municipal borrower forced into default by the turmoil in the variable rate borrowing market.
d. Harrisburg, PA
The crisis in the city of Harrisburg, PA illustrates how a chronic mismanagement and an extreme shock can push a city into financial distress. The Harrisburg Authority (THA) owns a waste-to-energy trash incinerator, which it purchased from Harrisburg in 1993. The incinerator was closed in 2003 in order to comply with orders from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). At that point a project to retrofit the incinerator began.
The project ran over-time and over-budget, and was financed with a sequence of revenue bonds issued by THA.
These bonds for the retrofit project now amounts to approximately $242 million, and debt service between 2010 and 2034 ranges from $14.6 million to $27.6 million per year. The project has now been completed, and since 2007 the facility has been operated by the Covanta, a private operator. Operating profits on the facility are not sufficient to cover maturity debt issued by THA. The revenue bonds have also been guaranteed by Harrisburg, and most of the debt was secondarily guaranteed by Dauphin County, of which Harrisburg is the county seat. Assured Guaranty, a relatively stable financial guarantor, has also underwritten policies insuring THA debt.
Harrisburg also has outstanding General Obligation debt not related to THA debt, and has revenue debt secured by parking concessions. Harrisburg apparently came close to skipping a payment on its GO debt, an outcome that was avoided only when the State of Pennsylvania accelerated payments due from the state to the city. THA bondholders have avoided losses because of the guarantees from the County and from Assured, both of which have filed suit against Harrisburg.
While many observers identify Harrisburg's guarantee of the THA debt as the source of its financial difficulties, it is more accurate to say that both the THA guarantee and years of chronic financial mismanagement are behind the city's trouble. The Pennsylvania Municipalities Recovery Act (Act 47) allows a distressed municipality to access professional services and other state support for crafting a recovery plan; Harrisburg has been operating under Act 47 since December 2010. This is not the same as a Chapter 9 filing, and does not preclude a Chapter 9 filing in the future. The State, in its approval of Harrisburg's request for Act 47 status, notes that budgets had been repeatedly 'balanced' only through one-time sale of assets and issuance of debt. A recent report by Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, which has been advising Harrisburg during the restructuring, notes that a Chapter 9 filing can be avoided through a combination of measures, notably including selling off city assets. Their report identifies the THA facility and parking facilities as the only likely sources of revenue, potentially augmented with the sale of certain city buildings. This plan, if followed, seems likely to allow Harrisburg to avoid default during the current recession.
Losses for bondholders will be ameliorated or prevented by the patchwork of guarantees and insurance policies: Dauphin County, Assured Guaranty, and Ambac (for the Harrisburg GO debt) may suffer losses if the current distress is not resolved. The case study does raise questions about the longer term. At some point, Harrisburg will have sold off all of its monetizable assets. Postponement of fiscal adjustments will make the eventual adjustment very abrupt.
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